





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Gould, A. J. (2017). Global assemblages and counter-piracy: public and private in maritime policing. POLICING
AND SOCIETY, 27(4), 408-418. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2015.1072180
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
	  1	  





Keywords	  	  Private	  Security,	  Maritime	  Piracy,	  Global	  Governance,	  Assemblage	  	  
	  
Abstract	  	  	  There	  is	  wide	  agreement	  among	  scholars	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  government	  to	  governance	  in	  security	  has	  seen	  unprecedented	  levels	  of	  cooperation	  (and	  competition)	  between	  private	  security	  actors	  (PSAs)	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  in	  the	  policing	  of	  public	  spaces,	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  fluid,	  diverse	  policing	  assemblages.	  With	  the	  overriding	  goal	  of	  investigating	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  security	  governance	  vary	  across	  time	  and	  space,	  this	  article	  seeks	  to	  explore	  security	  assemblage	  structures	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  Specifically,	  it	  studies	  the	  assembly	  of	  coercive	  force	  between	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  there,	  and	  compares	  this	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  multilateral	  security	  governance	  in	  other	  policing	  environments.	  On	  the	  back	  of	  this,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  security	  assemblages	  in	  maritime	  space	  involves	  a	  configuration	  of	  public	  and	  private	  in	  which	  private	  actors	  have	  great	  prominence	  in	  (and	  authority	  over)	  the	  distribution	  of	  legitimate	  coercive	  force	  in	  ‘public	  good’	  or	  ‘civilized’	  security	  provision.	  Consequently,	  it	  argues	  that	  in	  this	  space,	  private	  interests	  (rather	  than	  those	  of	  the	  nation)	  may	  be	  central	  in	  the	  assembly	  of	  ‘civilized’	  security	  interests.	  	  	  	  
	  
Introduction	  
	  	  It	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  policing	  has	  become	  increasingly	  ‘multilateralized’	  in	  recent	  decades.	  Prompted	  by	  the	  shift	  to	  ‘neo-­‐liberal	  political	  and	  economic	  rationalities’,	  the	  transfer	  of	  responsibility	  for	  crime	  prevention	  to	  individuals	  and	  communities,	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  ‘future-­‐oriented’	  risk	  mentality,	  law	  enforcement	  has	  come	  to	  incorporate	  citizen-­‐based	  policing	  initiatives,	  community	  support	  professionals,	  and	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  state	  institutions	  separate	  from	  the	  public	  police	  and	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  (Bradley,	  Sedgwick	  2009,	  p.	  478)	  	  	  Looming	  large	  in	  this	  new	  landscape	  of	  ‘plural	  policing’	  is	  the	  private	  security	  industry.	  Although	  scholarship	  on	  security	  privatization	  was	  subsumed	  for	  many	  years	  within	  a	  narrative	  of	  globalization	  that	  emphasized	  the	  dismantling,	  disaggregation	  or	  retreat	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  (Muthien,	  Taylor	  2002,	  p.	  186,	  Borzel,	  Riise	  2007,	  Hall,	  Biersteker	  2002,	  Cerny	  1999,	  Morris	  1997,	  Cable	  1995),	  recent	  work	  has	  emphasized	  the	  co-­‐existence	  and	  co-­‐operation	  (and	  competition)	  of	  PSAs	  and	  public	  policing	  authorities	  within,	  for	  example,	  ‘global	  security	  assemblages’	  (Abrahamsen,	  Williams	  2011)	  or	  ‘nodal’	  governance	  frameworks.	  (Shearing,	  Wood	  2003)	  The	  latter	  perspective,	  for	  one,	  argues	  that	  relationships	  between	  different	  ‘nodes’	  of	  security	  provision	  can	  be	  characterized	  not	  only	  by	  neglect	  or	  conflict,	  but	  also	  by	  contracting	  out,	  sponsorship,	  or	  hiving	  off.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  private	  security	  actors	  operate	  within	  an	  infinitely	  diverse	  range	  of	  socio-­‐political	  contexts,	  over	  which	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  generalize	  conceptually.	  As	  has	  been	  highlighted	  by	  Shearing	  and	  Stenning	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  ‘mass	  private	  property’,	  private	  security	  companies	  often	  undertake	  ‘private’	  policing,	  which	  is	  ‘tailored	  to	  the	  profit-­‐making	  objectives	  of	  its	  corporate	  clients’,	  and	  may	  be	  normatively	  at	  odds	  with	  principles	  of	  public	  law	  enforcement.	  (1983,	  p.	  500)	  In	  shopping	  centres,	  for	  example,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  PSAs	  seek	  to	  create	  islands	  of	  ‘consumerist	  citizenship’,	  which	  may	  be	  synonymous	  with	  socio-­‐economic	  or	  racial	  exclusion.	  (Voyce	  2006,	  p.	  273)	  Equally,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  private	  security	  actors	  often	  operate	  in	  spatial	  and	  normative	  harmony	  with	  public	  policing	  authorities	  (part	  of	  the	  same	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‘security	  project’)	  (Valverde	  2011),	  where	  their	  primary	  purpose	  is	  to	  guarantee	  public	  safety	  and	  freedom	  of	  movement	  in	  public	  space,	  and	  uphold	  the	  law.	  Ian	  Loader,	  on	  this	  distinction,	  qualifies	  a	  sphere	  of	  ‘public	  good’	  policing	  (1997,	  p.	  159);	  as	  Crawford	  and	  Lister	  have	  highlighted,	  PSAs	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  increasingly	  taking	  on	  ‘reassurance	  policing’	  roles,	  in	  which	  they	  aim	  to	  do	  no	  more	  than	  provide	  a	  visible	  deterrent	  to	  crime	  in	  public	  space.	  (2004a)	  Although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  private	  security	  actors	  have	  often	  been	  used	  in	  pursuit	  of	  exclusively	  ‘private’	  interests,	  therefore,	  they	  are	  also	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  security	  assemblages	  whose	  primary	  goal	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  ‘public’,	  democratic,	  ‘collective’	  (Jones,	  Newburn	  1998:	  p.	  34)	  security	  interest	  that	  dominates	  the	  politics	  of	  public	  space.	  	  	  It	  is	  the	  positioning	  of	  private	  security	  actors	  in	  these	  forms	  of	  assemblage,	  and	  their	  role	  in	  defining	  ‘civilized’	  security,	  that	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  article.	  Using	  the	  case	  of	  coercive	  force,	  it	  explores	  the	  distribution	  of	  authority	  between	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  number	  of	  public	  policing	  initiatives,	  and	  compares	  these	  to	  the	  assembly	  of	  security	  governance	  in	  maritime	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  As	  it	  will	  explore,	  the	  overwhelming	  picture	  of	  public-­‐private	  policing	  assemblages	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  authority	  to	  use	  (and	  distribute	  authority	  over)	  coercive	  force	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  public	  security	  project	  remains	  largely	  with	  the	  state.	  It	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  reflective	  of	  a	  view	  of	  the	  state	  and	  public	  policing	  authorities	  as	  the	  ultimate	  guarantors	  of	  ‘public’	  security	  interest,	  and	  possibly	  the	  institutions	  around	  which	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  ‘public’	  security	  is	  defined.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  maritime	  counter-­‐piracy	  assemblages,	  however,	  this	  article	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  private	  security	  actors	  appear	  to	  have	  far	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  authority	  over	  (and	  use	  of)	  coercive	  force,	  and	  that	  this	  may	  indicate	  an	  assembly	  of	  ‘public	  good’	  security	  interests	  in	  which	  commercial	  interests,	  more	  than	  those	  of	  the	  nation,	  are	  central.	  	  	  	  	  
Private	  Security	  and	  Public	  Policing	  
	  	  Although	  an	  article	  of	  this	  length	  cannot	  explore	  them	  comprehensively,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  multitude	  of	  processes	  have	  driven	  the	  emergence	  of	  private	  security	  actors.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  focused,	  for	  example,	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  ‘neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  post-­‐Fordist,	  or	  post-­‐Keynesian	  trajectories’	  (Abrahamsen,	  Williams	  2008)	  in	  security	  and	  policing,	  while	  others	  have	  highlighted	  the	  rise	  of	  ‘denizenships’	  (Shearing,	  Wood	  2003),	  the	  securitization	  of	  residential	  space,	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  ‘mass	  private	  property’	  (Shearing,	  Stenning	  1983).	  Roles	  once	  occupied	  exclusively	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agents	  are	  now	  frequently	  undertaken	  partially	  or	  wholly	  by	  PSAs;	  it	  has	  often	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  strengthened,	  rather	  than	  weakened,	  state	  law	  enforcement.	  (Abrahamsen,	  Williams	  2007)	  Although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  private	  security	  actors	  have	  often	  been	  used	  to	  secure	  private	  spaces	  (where	  they	  may	  uphold	  ‘alternate	  criminal	  justice	  system[s]’	  (Morgan,	  Shanahan	  1990),	  it	  is	  equally	  clear	  that	  they	  have	  frequently	  been	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  statist	  ‘security	  project’,	  operating	  within	  the	  same	  security	  logics	  and	  spatial	  scales	  as	  public	  policing	  authorities,	  and	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  new,	  ‘public’	  security	  assemblages.	  The	  next	  section	  of	  this	  article	  will	  give	  a	  brief	  background	  to	  the	  roles	  generally	  occupied	  by	  PSAs	  in	  such	  contexts,	  before	  assessing	  how	  the	  essential	  function	  of	  coercive	  force	  is	  assembled	  therein,	  and	  why.	  	  	  Bradley,	  for	  one,	  has	  described	  the	  role	  of	  PSAs	  in	  filling	  the	  ‘reassurance’	  gap,	  created	  by	  perpetually	  increasing	  public	  insecurity	  and	  the	  diminishing	  ability	  of	  public	  policing	  authorities	  to	  provide	  a	  visible	  security	  presence.	  (Bradley,	  Sedgwick	  2009,	  p.	  478)	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CCID	  project,	  targeted	  at	  improving	  security	  in	  the	  central	  business	  district	  of	  Cape	  Town,	  G4S	  has	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  heightening	  the	  visibility	  of	  patrols	  (‘far	  exceeding’	  state	  security	  architecture	  in	  this	  respect),	  while	  remaining	  ‘closely	  networked’	  with	  both	  the	  City	  Police	  and	  South	  African	  Police	  Service.	  (Abrahamsen,	  Williams	  2011)	  In	  another	  scheme	  typical	  of	  ‘purchased	  patrol	  services’	  (Crawford,	  Lister	  2004b),	  Securitas	  has	  recently	  formed	  a	  security	  partnership	  with	  the	  City	  of	  Moedling	  in	  Austria,	  providing	  a	  ‘preventive’	  patrol	  presence	  (the	  Securitas	  Service	  Guards)	  and	  enforcing	  parking	  and	  litter	  regulations	  around	  the	  city.	  One	  of	  the	  appeals	  of	  the	  scheme	  is	  that	  Securitas’	  contract	  is	  partly	  self-­‐financed	  (by	  parking	  fines);	  according	  to	  the	  city’s	  Mayor,	  ‘people	  feel	  safer’	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  private	  security	  presence.	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(Securitas	  2014)	  In	  2011,	  G4S	  was	  made	  the	  official	  security	  services	  provider	  for	  the	  2012	  Olympic	  Games	  in	  London,	  contracted	  to	  provide	  ‘training	  and	  management’	  for	  a	  10,000-­‐strong	  force	  (comprised	  of	  private	  security	  guards,	  military	  personnel,	  and	  volunteers)	  to	  work	  across	  all	  the	  Games’	  venues.	  (Daily	  Telegraph	  2013)	  	  	  More	  than	  just	  uncovering	  the	  plurality	  of	  new	  security	  actors,	  however,	  we	  must	  be	  concerned	  with	  exploring	  the	  ways	  knowledge,	  authority	  and	  functions	  are	  disassembled	  and	  reassembled	  in	  the	  new	  public	  policing	  assemblages,	  and	  why.	  As	  Abrahamsen	  and	  Williams	  highlight,	  these	  assemblages	  are	  infinitely	  diverse,	  and	  understanding	  the	  (re)configuration	  of	  public	  and	  private	  in	  particular	  forms	  of	  assemblage	  is	  essential	  in	  understanding	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  security	  provision	  vary	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  As	  the	  next	  part	  of	  this	  article	  will	  demonstrate,	  one	  remarkably	  consistent	  fact	  of	  the	  assembly	  of	  public	  and	  private	  security	  actors	  in	  public	  security	  is	  the	  primacy	  of	  public	  policing	  authorities	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  coercive	  powers;	  as	  some	  assert,	  ‘the	  state’s	  role	  as	  a	  crucial	  site	  of	  governance’	  (Johnston	  2006,	  p.	  34)	  hinges	  on	  its	  ‘capacity	  for…coercion’.	  (Abrahamsen,	  Williams	  2011).	  According	  to	  Bittner,	  public	  policing	  authorities	  ‘have	  a	  distinctive	  capacity	  which	  enables	  them	  to	  deal	  with	  any	  eventuality	  –	  the	  capacity	  to	  use	  force	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state’.	  (Jones,	  Newburn	  1998,	  p.	  248-­‐9)	  	  The	  2008	  Annual	  Report	  on	  Cape	  Town’s	  CCID	  project,	  for	  example,	  boasts	  that	  CCID	  officers	  ‘assisted’	  the	  South	  African	  Police	  Service	  with	  (rather	  than	  conducting)	  the	  9,570	  arrests	  made	  in	  the	  district	  that	  year.	  (Cape	  Town	  CCID	  2008)	  The	  Downtown	  Ambassadors,	  licensed	  private	  security	  officers	  who	  patrol	  a	  90-­‐block	  area	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Vancouver	  (funded	  by	  the	  Downtown	  Vancouver	  Business	  Improvement	  Association)	  similarly	  have	  ‘no	  authority	  to	  tell	  people	  to	  move	  along	  when	  on	  public	  property’,	  nor	  are	  allowed	  to	  carry	  or	  use	  ‘firearms,	  truncheons	  or	  billets’.	  (BC	  Human	  Rights	  Coalition	  2014)	  	  These	  cases,	  moreover,	  are	  representative	  of	  a	  wider	  legislative	  agenda	  that	  intends	  to	  keep	  PSCs	  in	  ‘an	  inferior	  position’	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  use	  of	  legitimate	  coercive	  force.	  (Yoshida	  1999,	  p.	  259)	  	  In	  Japan,	  security	  guards	  are	  forbidden	  from	  using	  any	  tool	  or	  device	  for	  purposes	  other	  than	  self-­‐defense,	  and	  the	  mere	  possession	  of	  all	  such	  devices	  must	  be	  registered	  with	  the	  public	  police;	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  256)	  article	  8	  of	  Japan’s	  Security	  Business	  Act	  is	  explicit	  in	  its	  non-­‐granting	  of	  ‘special	  powers’	  to	  private	  security	  companies	  or	  guards.	  Under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  UK	  Prevention	  of	  Crime	  Act	  1953,	  likewise,	  private	  security	  guards	  are	  unable	  to	  carry	  truncheons	  or	  any	  other	  ‘offensive	  weapons’	  in	  public	  places.	  (South	  1988,	  p.	  125)	  PSCs	  in	  Nigeria	  are	  prohibited	  from	  carrying	  firearms	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Private	  Guard	  Companies	  Act	  (1986);	  the	  result	  of	  this	  is	  a	  ‘significant	  fusion	  of	  public	  and	  private	  authority	  and	  responsibility’	  (Abrahamsen,	  Williams	  2011,	  p.	  138)	  in	  which	  heavily-­‐armed	  MoPol	  (Mobile	  Police)	  Officers	  routinely	  accompany	  private	  security	  officers	  on	  operations,	  and,	  though	  supervised	  by	  PSC	  agents,	  are	  ultimately	  accountable	  to	  their	  own	  commanders	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  Police.	  While,	  in	  some	  countries,	  private	  security	  operatives	  are	  able	  to	  carry	  weapons	  in	  their	  capacity	  as	  citizens,	  they	  are	  not	  empowered	  to	  use	  them	  in	  any	  context	  other	  than	  self-­‐defense,	  and	  remain	  in	  a	  subordinate	  position	  insofar	  as	  such	  weapons	  can	  be	  used	  in	  defense	  of	  the	  law	  or	  public	  space.	  As	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Netherlands’	  Stadswachten	  suggests,	  the	  same	  restrictions	  may	  apply	  to	  ‘city	  wardens’	  and	  other	  state-­‐funded	  law	  enforcement	  bodies	  separate	  from	  the	  public	  police.	  (Hofstra,	  Shapland	  1997)	  	  But	  how	  should	  this	  affect	  what	  we	  think	  about	  the	  way	  security	  is	  assembled?	  Although,	  in	  contemporary	  security	  governance	  structures,	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  is	  often	  blurred,	  the	  experience	  of	  coercive	  force	  indicates	  that	  different	  nodes	  do	  not	  occupy	  the	  same	  positions	  in	  the	  new	  policing	  assemblages.	  This	  cannot	  be	  boiled	  down	  to	  a	  subordination	  of	  PSAs	  in	  a	  ‘junior	  partner’	  role,	  but	  is	  the	  result	  of	  how	  both	  public	  and	  private	  security	  actors	  (and	  the	  consuming	  public)	  view	  their	  places	  in	  the	  complex	  of	  knowledge	  and	  authority	  of	  public	  law	  enforcement.	  The	  fact	  that	  public	  policing	  authorities	  largely	  retain	  exclusive	  competence	  over	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  the	  spatial	  and	  normative	  context	  of	  ‘public’	  security	  provision	  suggests	  that	  even	  in	  an	  age	  where	  the	  responsibility	  and	  knowledge	  of	  security	  provision	  is	  so	  dispersed,	  there	  are	  certain	  competences	  that	  remain	  the	  realm	  of	  government.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  has	  sought	  to	  completely	  monopolize	  the	  use	  of	  coercive	  force	  within	  its	  area	  of	  jurisdiction,	  but	  that	  in	  public	  space,	  it	  retains	  a	  central	  role	  in	  enforcing	  what	  Loader	  sees	  as	  the	  ‘collective	  good’	  of	  the	  public	  security	  project	  (as	  defined	  by	  both	  logic	  and	  scale).	  Although	  private	  security	  actors	  are	  free	  to	  exercise	  coercive	  power	  on	  private	  property	  (where	  public	  police	  are	  ‘philosophically	  disinclined’	  to	  exercise	  authority)	  (Shearing,	  Stenning	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1983,	  p.	  497),	  they	  have	  a	  limited	  role	  in	  doing	  so	  where	  the	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  entity	  which	  defines,	  and	  is	  the	  ultimate	  guarantor	  of,	  the	  ‘collective’	  security	  interest.	  	  	  As	  the	  role	  of	  private	  actors	  in	  securing	  private	  property	  attests	  to,	  however,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  coercive	  force	  is	  distributed	  (and	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  of	  which	  it	  is	  reflective)	  is	  highly	  spatially	  contingent.	  While	  the	  assembly	  of	  coercive	  authority	  on	  private	  property	  is	  reflective	  of	  authority	  frameworks	  dominated	  by	  private	  individuals	  and	  their	  interests	  (whether	  ‘consumerist	  citizenship’	  or	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  exclusion	  of	  ‘fortified	  residential’	  space	  (Pow	  2013)	  that	  of	  public	  space	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  reflective	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  as	  the	  driver	  of	  the	  ‘civilizing’	  of	  security,	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  security	  became	  a	  public,	  national	  good.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  article,	  however,	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  assembly	  of	  coercive	  authority	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  ‘public’	  maritime	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations,	  and	  explore	  its	  implications	  for	  how	  we	  should	  think	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  there.	  As	  first	  point	  of	  inquiry,	  however,	  it	  will	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  global	  piracy	  problem,	  and	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  security	  industry	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  maritime	  security.	  	  	  	  
	  
Counter-­‐Piracy	  and	  Public	  Security	  	  Maritime	  piracy1	  has	  been	  a	  security	  issue	  of	  ever-­‐increasing	  prominence	  during	  the	  last	  decade.	  One	  2010	  report,	  by	  a	  working	  group	  from	  the	  organization	  Oceans	  beyond	  Piracy,	  estimated	  the	  cost	  of	  piracy	  to	  the	  global	  economy	  to	  be	  between	  $7bn	  and	  $12bn	  annually	  (Bowden	  2010);	  according	  to	  Peter	  Chalk,	  there	  were	  2,463	  actual	  or	  attempted	  acts	  of	  piracy	  recorded	  globally	  between	  2000	  and	  2006.	  Although	  historically,	  dealing	  with	  piracy	  has	  been	  a	  matter	  exclusively	  for	  ‘private	  or	  corporate	  actors’,	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  seen	  a	  ‘new	  level	  of	  international	  political	  engagement’	  in	  anti-­‐piracy	  operations.	  (Bueger	  et	  al	  2011,	  p.	  356)	  As	  Bueger	  writes,	  Somali	  piracy	  ‘has	  become	  a	  frequent	  subject	  of	  UNSC	  deliberations’,	  as	  well	  as	  (in	  2008-­‐09	  alone)	  Resolutions	  1816,	  1838,	  1846	  and	  1851.	  Owing	  to	  its	  links	  to	  terrorism	  (Luft,	  Korin	  2004)	  and	  poor	  governance	  (Rice	  2008),	  as	  well	  as	  its	  great	  cost	  to	  national	  economies,	  piracy	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘threat	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security’	  rather	  than	  just	  a	  threat	  to	  commercial	  shipping	  (Bueger	  2011).	  In	  addition	  to	  an	  international	  coordination	  group	  (the	  Contact	  Group	  on	  Countering	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia),	  a	  number	  of	  multinational	  naval	  forces	  (including	  the	  Combined	  Task	  Forces	  and	  Operation	  Atalanta)	  have	  been	  established	  to	  police	  the	  high-­‐risk	  areas	  around	  Somalia	  and	  the	  Western	  Indian	  Ocean.	  	  	  Clearly,	  however,	  these	  arrangements	  have	  been	  insufficient	  as	  a	  security	  solution	  on	  their	  own.	  Col.	  Richard	  Spencer	  (formerly	  the	  head	  of	  the	  EU	  Task	  Force)	  has	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  military	  resource	  is	  finite	  and	  only	  treats	  the	  symptoms’	  and	  that	  policing	  the	  area	  at	  risk	  would	  require	  ‘five	  times	  as	  many	  warships	  as	  the	  task	  force	  can	  muster,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  helicopter’.	  (Economist	  2014)	  In	  recent	  years,	  pirates	  in	  the	  HRA	  have	  operated	  at	  distances	  from	  the	  coastline	  far	  greater	  than	  previously	  thought	  possible,	  and	  well	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  public	  security	  architecture;	  in	  2008,	  the	  MV	  Sirius	  Star	  was	  successfully	  hijacked	  (and	  subsequently	  ransomed)	  while	  450nm	  from	  the	  Kenyan	  coastline.	  The	  problem	  of	  law	  enforcement	  is	  exacerbated	  further	  by	  the	  ‘catch	  and	  release’	  policies	  often	  pursued	  by	  naval	  task	  forces	  in	  the	  region,	  which	  dictate	  the	  release	  of	  suspected	  pirates	  in	  the	  face	  of	  long	  and	  costly	  national	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  article	  will	  use	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  as	  provided	  by	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea;	  Piracy	  consists	  of	  any	  of	  the	  following	  acts:	  (a)	  any	  illegal	  acts	  of	  violence	  or	  detention,	  or	  any	  act	  of	  depredation,	  committed	  for	  private	  ends	  by	  the	  crew	  or	  the	  passengers	  of	  a	  private	  ship	  or	  a	  private	  aircraft,	  and	  directed:	  (i)	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  against	  another	  ship	  or	  aircraft,	  or	  against	  persons	  or	  property	  on	  board	  such	  ship	  or	  aircraft;	  (ii)	  against	  a	  ship,	  aircraft,	  persons	  or	  property	  in	  a	  place	  outside	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  State;	  (b)	  any	  act	  of	  voluntary	  participation	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  ship	  or	  of	  an	  aircraft	  with	  knowledge	  of	  facts	  making	  it	  a	  pirate	  ship	  or	  aircraft;	  (c)	  any	  act	  of	  inciting	  or	  of	  intentionally	  facilitating	  an	  act	  described	  in	  subparagraph	  (a)	  or	  (b).	  See	  http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm,	  accessed	  15.10.2014	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international	  prosecutions.	  In	  an	  article	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Law,	  on	  this	  theme,	  Guilfoyle	  argues	  that	  attempts	  to	  make	  the	  threat	  of	  prosecution	  a	  realistic	  deterrent	  to	  piratical	  activity	  will	  fail	  as	  long	  as	  the	  rate	  of	  capture	  continues	  at	  its	  current,	  low	  level.	  (2012a)	  	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  pervasive	  public	  security	  infrastructure	  (and	  the	  growing	  securitization	  of	  maritime	  space),	  shipowners	  have	  increasingly	  begun	  to	  call	  on	  private	  security	  guards	  to	  protect	  crew	  and	  cargo;	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  40%	  of	  ships	  passing	  through	  the	  high	  risk	  area	  carry	  private	  security	  teams	  (Economist).	  What’s	  more,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  rather	  than	  viewing	  PSAs	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  their	  authority,	  there	  is	  now	  unprecedented	  recognition	  and	  support	  among	  states	  and	  the	  international	  community	  of	  the	  contribution	  the	  private	  sector	  makes	  to	  security	  provision	  in	  the	  region.	  In	  May	  2011,	  the	  89th	  Maritime	  Safety	  Committee	  of	  the	  IMO	  placed	  authority	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  armed	  private	  security	  officers	  squarely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  flag	  states,	  providing	  tacit	  approval	  for	  their	  use	  in	  international	  waters	  (IMO	  2011).	  In	  October	  of	  that	  year,	  meanwhile,	  David	  Cameron	  indicated	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  UK-­‐flagged	  ships	  would	  be	  able	  to	  carry	  armed	  guards	  in	  the	  high-­‐risk	  zone.	  (BBC	  2011)	  The	  US	  Navy	  has	  also	  encouraged	  shipping	  companies	  to	  employ	  privately	  contracted	  armed	  security	  personnel,	  highlighting	  the	  limitations	  of	  naval	  forces	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  have	  the	  Greek,	  Spanish,	  Danish,	  Swedish	  and	  German	  Governments	  (Liss	  2012,	  Burgin,	  Schneider	  2015,	  Berndtsson,	  Ostensen	  2015).	  Many	  security	  professionals	  view	  the	  anti-­‐piracy	  regime	  in	  the	  region	  as	  comprised	  of	  three	  pillars	  (best	  management	  practices	  for	  merchant	  masters,	  naval	  task	  forces,	  and	  private	  security	  companies);	  at	  a	  recent	  summit,	  Robert	  Missen	  (the	  head	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Land	  and	  Maritime	  Security	  Unit)	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  sharp	  drop	  in	  incidents	  [in	  the	  HRA]	  was	  the	  greater	  presence	  of	  armed	  guards’.	  (MARSEC)	  	  As	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  article	  will	  argue,	  however,	  discourses	  on	  maritime	  security	  provision	  suggest	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  authority	  over	  the	  use	  of	  coercive	  force	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations	  is	  stacked	  more	  in	  favour	  of	  private	  actors	  than	  is	  the	  case	  for	  other	  contexts	  of	  public	  security	  provision.	  As	  first	  point	  of	  inquiry,	  it	  will	  investigate	  debates	  over	  the	  use	  of	  ‘letters	  of	  marque’	  and	  private	  navies	  to	  combat	  piracy	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  	  	  	  
	  
Letters	  of	  Marque	  and	  Private	  Navies	  
	  Historically,	  privateering	  emerged	  out	  of	  many	  of	  the	  same	  commercial	  and	  political	  challenges	  as	  exist	  in	  contemporary	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations.	  Initially	  used	  to	  provide	  ‘a	  form	  of	  international	  redress	  for	  wrongful	  maritime	  takings’	  (Hutchins	  2011),	  privateering	  became	  ‘an	  economical	  way	  to	  augment	  naval	  forces	  in	  wartime’	  (Cooperstein	  2009,	  p.	  221)	  and	  protect	  merchant	  vessels	  from	  pirates;	  in	  essence,	  ‘a	  means	  for	  conducting	  public	  warfare	  with	  private	  actors’.	  (Hutchins	  2011,	  p.	  845)	  In	  1856,	  the	  majority	  of	  maritime	  powers	  signed	  the	  Paris	  Declaration,	  which	  forbade	  the	  commissioning	  of	  privateers	  against	  fellow	  signatories	  (but	  not,	  crucially,	  against	  pirates);	  according	  to	  some,	  this	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  customary	  international	  law	  prohibiting	  any	  use	  of	  letters	  of	  marque.	  (ICRC)	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  however,	  the	  mobilization	  of	  ‘volunteer’	  or	  commissioned	  merchant	  vessels	  continued	  until	  1945;	  perhaps	  most	  prominently	  during	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1904-­‐5.	  	  In	  a	  column	  in	  April	  2009,	  however,	  Texas	  Congressman	  Ron	  Paul	  advocated	  a	  return	  to	  privateering	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  contemporary	  piracy	  problem.	  Noting	  that	  ‘there	  are	  calls	  to	  increase	  the	  size	  of	  our	  navy	  until	  it	  is	  almost	  omnipresent	  on	  the	  seas’,	  Dr.	  Paul	  called	  on	  Congress	  to	  issue	  letters	  of	  marque	  and	  reprisal,	  ‘deputizing	  private	  organizations	  to	  act	  within	  the	  law	  to	  disable	  and	  capture	  those	  involved	  in	  piracy’.	  (Paul	  2009)	  Hutchins	  speculates	  that	  such	  privateers,	  if	  discovering	  evidence	  of	  piracy,	  would	  be	  empowered	  to	  ‘seize	  the	  vessel,	  arrest	  persons	  on	  board,	  and	  subject	  such	  persons	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts	  of	  the	  state	  (or	  international	  organization)	  that	  issued	  the	  letter	  of	  marque’.	  Hutchins	  2011,	  p.	  868)	  As	  Cooperstein	  points	  out,	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  has	  retained	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  such	  documents,	  and	  vest	  in	  private	  maritime	  actors	  its	  full	  sovereign	  authority.	  (2009)	  Others	  have	  also	  expressed	  support	  for	  the	  reissuing	  of	  letters	  of	  marque;	  for	  example,	  Alexandra	  Schwartz	  and	  Theodore	  Richard.	  (Hutchins	  2011)	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Elements	  within	  the	  contemporary	  private	  security	  industry	  have	  certainly	  shown	  an	  interest	  in	  exercising	  paramilitary	  capabilities.	  In	  2008,	  Blackwater	  Worldwide	  (now	  trading	  as	  Academi),	  reconfigured	  the	  U.S.-­‐flagged	  NOAAS	  McArthur,	  a	  183-­‐foot	  vessel	  previously	  used	  for	  oceanographic	  research,	  to	  undertake	  maritime	  security	  operations	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden	  and	  Western	  Indian	  Ocean.	  It	  fitted	  a	  number	  of	  .50-­‐caliber	  machine	  guns	  and	  a	  port	  for	  an	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicle	  (UAV),	  as	  well	  as	  building	  two	  helipads	  and	  the	  infrastructure	  for	  eighteen	  armed	  security	  personnel	  and	  fifteen	  crew.	  (New	  York	  Times	  2011)	  The	  operational	  framework	  of	  the	  Blackwater	  vessel	  was	  never	  fully	  clear	  (a	  leaked	  diplomatic	  cable	  from	  2009	  stated	  that	  the	  McArthur	  would	  ‘be	  able	  to	  protect	  a	  3-­‐ship	  convoy’),	  but	  its	  level	  of	  military	  capability	  would	  certainly	  suggest	  rules	  of	  engagement	  a	  little	  more	  expansive	  than	  those	  of	  a	  typical	  on-­‐ship	  security	  team.	  On	  this	  point,	  the	  same	  cable	  suggested	  that	  ‘Blackwater	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  take	  any	  pirates	  into	  custody,	  but	  it	  will	  use	  lethal	  force	  against	  pirates	  if	  necessary’.	  (Ibid.)	  In	  a	  more	  recent	  venture	  in	  January	  2012,	  Typhon	  launched	  an	  even	  more	  ambitious	  naval	  security	  force,	  hoping	  to	  have	  10	  vessels	  at	  sea	  within	  24	  months.	  Although,	  as	  for	  the	  McArthur,	  the	  rules	  of	  engagement	  for	  this	  force	  have	  never	  been	  made	  fully	  clear,	  the	  project’s	  chief	  backer	  (Anthony	  Sharp),	  boasted	  that	  the	  Typhon	  force	  would	  be	  ‘the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  for	  probably	  200	  years’.	  (Sibun	  2012)	  	  The	  idea	  that	  privateer	  fleets	  will	  come	  to	  freely	  roam	  contemporary	  piracy	  hot-­‐zones	  is	  perhaps	  slightly	  fanciful.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  such	  operations	  would	  be	  financed	  (self-­‐financing	  through	  captured	  goods	  is	  not	  a	  viable	  option)	  remains	  unresolved,	  as	  does	  that	  of	  whether	  PSCs	  can	  be	  trusted	  to	  correctly	  identify	  pirates.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decline	  of	  privateering	  during	  the	  19th	  century,	  after	  all,	  was	  that	  privateers	  often	  descended	  into	  piratical	  activity	  themselves;	  having	  failed	  to	  capture	  any	  pirates	  after	  receiving	  a	  privateer	  commission	  in	  1696,	  William	  Kidd	  began	  to	  attack	  ‘innocent	  trading	  vessels’	  (Richard	  2010,	  p.	  412)	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  secure	  income.	  This	  problem	  looms	  even	  larger	  in	  the	  contemporary	  maritime	  environment,	  where	  pirates	  are	  often	  ‘indistinguishable’	  (FT	  2014)	  from	  innocent	  fishermen,	  sometimes	  themselves	  heavily-­‐armed.	  In	  2005,	  three	  SOMCAN	  guards	  were	  convicted	  of	  piracy	  in	  Thailand	  (and	  sentenced	  to	  10	  years’	  imprisonment)	  after	  hijacking	  a	  Thai	  fishing	  trawler	  and	  demanding	  a	  ransom	  of	  $800,000	  for	  its	  release.	  (Bahadur	  2011)	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  discourse	  on	  contemporary	  privateering	  can	  certainly	  inform	  our	  perspective	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  public-­‐private	  relations	  in	  policing	  offshore.	  Employing	  private	  contractors	  to	  identify,	  detain	  and	  bring	  suspected	  criminals	  before	  the	  courts	  (or	  allowing	  the	  proliferation	  of	  private	  security	  teams	  that	  routinely	  use	  lethal	  force	  without	  direct	  oversight)	  would	  be	  unthinkable	  in	  any	  other	  policing	  context,	  but	  apparently	  not	  so	  in	  contemporary	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations;	  why	  is	  this?	  What	  does	  this	  tell	  us	  about	  state	  control	  over	  the	  practice	  of	  ‘public’	  security	  provision	  on	  the	  high	  seas?	  As	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  article	  will	  seek	  to	  demonstrate,	  the	  privateering	  discourse	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  in	  isolation.	  If	  the	  authority	  of	  coercive	  power	  in	  many	  contexts	  of	  public	  policing	  appears	  to	  be	  assembled	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  privilege	  the	  state,	  there	  clearly	  remains	  a	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  policing	  authorities	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  security	  consumers	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  legislative	  regulation	  of	  the	  private	  security	  industry’s	  coercive	  power).	  As	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  article	  will	  explore,	  however,	  this	  dividing	  line	  between	  public	  and	  private	  in	  the	  maritime	  community	  appears	  to	  be	  far	  less	  clear,	  and	  the	  industry	  has	  itself	  stepped	  in	  to	  regulate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  force	  should	  be	  used	  by	  private	  security	  companies.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Jurisdiction	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Force	  
	  Unlike	  in	  many	  other	  spheres	  of	  maritime	  activity,	  international	  organizations,	  for	  example,	  make	  little	  prescription	  as	  to	  a	  distinction	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  right	  to	  use	  force	  offshore.	  In	  its	  recommendations	  for	  the	  use	  of	  private	  security	  companies	  in	  the	  high-­‐risk	  area,	  for	  example,	  the	  International	  Maritime	  Organization	  states	  that	  ‘the	  carriage	  of	  such	  personnel	  and	  their	  firearms….is	  subject	  to	  flag	  state	  legislation	  and	  policies	  and	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  flag	  states	  to	  determine	  if	  and	  under	  which	  conditions	  this	  will	  be	  authorized.’	  (IMO	  2012,	  see	  also	  Priddy	  2014)	  Douglas	  Guilfoyle,	  similarly,	  has	  stated	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  distinction	  drawn	  in	  maritime	  law	  between	  a	  naval	  vessel	  and	  a	  flagged	  merchant	  ship	  with	  PCASP	  on	  board;	  if	  flag	  state	  use-­‐of-­‐
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force	  guidelines	  are	  ‘tantamount	  to	  a	  license	  to	  kill’,	  any	  criminal	  acts	  undertaken	  by	  a	  PSC	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  state	  and	  the	  international	  human	  rights	  regime,	  not	  the	  offending	  security	  personnel.	  (2012b)	  	  	  Even	  where	  private	  security	  actors	  have	  more	  modest	  security	  ambitions	  than	  the	  privateers	  or	  private	  naval	  forces	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  moreover,	  there	  is	  still	  widespread	  confusion	  within	  the	  industry	  about	  the	  powers	  they	  (as	  non-­‐state	  actors)	  can	  legally	  exercise.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  Claude	  Berube	  in	  January	  2009,	  the	  former	  Head	  of	  Security	  of	  Blackwater’s	  
McArthur	  lamented	  that	  ‘there	  is	  tremendous	  confusion	  industry-­‐wide	  about	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  pirates	  when	  they’re	  taken,	  rules	  of	  engagement,	  insurance	  issues…’	  (CIMES	  2013);	  a	  2011	  report	  by	  the	  UK	  Parliamentary	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee,	  similarly,	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  guidance	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  particularly	  lethal	  force,	  is	  very	  limited	  and	  there	  is	  little	  to	  help	  a	  master	  make	  a	  judgment	  on	  where	  force	  can	  be	  used.’	  (UK	  Government	  2012)	  As	  Pitney	  and	  Levin	  write,	  as	  no	  PSC	  has	  yet	  been	  granted	  explicit	  authority	  to	  detain	  pirates	  by	  its	  flag,	  the	  legality	  of	  private	  detention	  ‘will	  require	  explicit	  clarification	  if	  PMSC	  vessels	  capture	  pirates	  more	  frequently	  in	  a	  future	  conflict.’	  (Pitney	  Jr,	  Levin	  2013,	  pp.	  99-­‐100)	  Tellingly,	  a	  British	  foreign	  affairs	  committee	  report	  in	  2011	  recommended	  that	  use-­‐of-­‐force	  guidelines	  for	  maritime	  private	  security	  teams	  ‘should	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  rules	  that	  would	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  members	  of	  the	  UK	  armed	  forces	  in	  similar	  circumstances’.	  (UK	  Government	  2012)	  	  It	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  existing	  documents	  on	  the	  legalities	  of	  private	  force	  hold	  few	  clues	  as	  to	  best	  practice	  in	  the	  marine	  environment.	  The	  International	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Private	  Security	  Service	  Providers,	  for	  example,	  asserts	  that	  signatory	  companies	  ‘will	  not	  take	  or	  hold	  any	  persons	  except	  when	  apprehending	  persons	  to	  defend	  themselves	  or	  others	  against	  an	  imminent	  threat	  of	  violence’,	  and	  even	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  must	  hand	  over	  ‘such	  detained	  persons	  to	  the	  Competent	  Authority	  at	  the	  earliest	  opportunity.’	  (ICoC	  2010)	  Detaining	  a	  pirate	  in	  order	  to	  hand	  them	  over	  to	  a	  public	  policing	  authority	  ‘at	  the	  earliest	  opportunity’,	  for	  example,	  might	  mean	  imprisoning	  them	  for	  a	  journey	  of	  several	  hundred	  nautical	  miles,	  an	  act	  without	  precedent	  for	  private	  security	  actors.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  telling	  that	  possibly	  the	  foremost	  source	  of	  guidance	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  maritime	  PSAs	  (the	  100	  series	  rules)	  is	  a	  self-­‐regulatory	  document,	  produced	  by	  the	  industry	  to	  provide	  broad-­‐brush	  best	  practice	  on	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  lethal	  force	  can	  be	  used.	  Rather	  than	  a	  piece	  of	  national	  or	  international	  legislation	  (indeed,	  the	  project	  was	  launched	  specifically	  because	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  ‘state-­‐led	  initiatives	  and	  state	  legislation’),	  the	  rules	  are	  ‘set	  out	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  Master,	  ship	  owner,	  charterer,	  insurer,	  underwriters,	  private	  maritime	  security	  companies,	  PCASP	  and	  interested	  third	  parties’.	  (100	  Series	  Rules)	  	  	  	  
	  
Offshore	  Policing	  Assemblages	  
	  Clearly,	  the	  private	  security	  sector	  has	  substantial	  involvement	  in	  many	  aspects	  of	  public	  policing.	  As	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  article	  sought	  to	  argue,	  however,	  public	  and	  private	  are	  generally	  assembled	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  privilege	  the	  state	  in	  the	  use	  of	  (and	  distribution	  of	  authority	  over)	  coercive	  force.	  Given	  the	  diversity	  of	  private	  security	  proliferation	  globally,	  this	  narrative	  has	  been	  remarkably	  consistent.	  In	  a	  world	  in	  which	  responsibility	  for	  security	  provision	  is	  dispersed	  between	  private	  security	  companies,	  citizen-­‐based	  policing	  initiatives	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  public	  and	  private	  entities,	  this	  shows	  that	  the	  state	  remains	  a	  vitally	  important	  site	  of	  authority	  in	  the	  governance	  and	  delivery	  of	  ‘public’	  policing.	  	  	  The	  story	  of	  coercive	  force	  in	  public-­‐private	  assemblages	  in	  counter-­‐piracy,	  however,	  is	  rather	  different.	  Not	  only	  have	  states	  countenanced	  private	  control	  of	  weapons	  and	  lethal	  force	  as	  an	  aspect	  (and	  possibly	  the	  substance)	  of	  their	  own	  public	  policing	  solutions,	  but	  some	  have	  even	  suggested	  that	  private	  actors	  come	  to	  take	  on	  powers	  of	  arrest	  and	  detention	  through	  the	  use	  of	  ‘letters	  of	  marque’	  to	  combat	  maritime	  piracy.	  Just	  as	  importantly,	  however,	  the	  line	  distinguishing	  public	  and	  private	  security	  actors	  in	  the	  legalities	  of	  coercive	  force	  appears	  more	  blurred	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  than	  elsewhere.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  regulatory	  measures	  such	  as	  the	  BMP	  (Best	  Management	  Practices)	  and	  100	  series	  rules,	  furthermore,	  the	  industry	  itself	  has	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sought	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  state	  oversight	  by	  regulating	  the	  ways	  in	  security	  companies	  can	  use	  coercive	  force.	  	  	  However,	  what	  does	  this	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  assembly	  of	  maritime	  security?	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  infer	  from	  the	  general	  realities	  of	  coercive	  authority	  in	  public	  space	  that	  the	  state	  remains	  in	  a	  privileged	  position	  in	  the	  assembly	  of	  ‘public’	  security	  provision.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  surprising;	  public	  policing	  authorities	  are,	  after	  all,	  the	  institutions	  around	  which	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  security	  as	  a	  public	  good	  (as	  Loader	  puts	  it,	  ‘civilized’)	  was	  defined.	  If,	  as	  Bueger	  (2011)	  posits,	  dealing	  with	  maritime	  security	  threats	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  matter	  for	  ‘private	  or	  corporate	  actors’	  and	  not	  states	  (certainly,	  the	  near-­‐independent	  operation	  of	  maritime	  PSAs	  would	  support	  this	  view),	  how	  far	  should	  we	  continue	  to	  view	  the	  ‘civilized’	  security	  project	  there	  as	  underpinned	  by	  a	  democratic	  security	  interest	  of	  which	  state	  authority	  is	  at	  the	  centre?	  	  	  The	  question	  here,	  of	  course,	  concerns	  whether	  there	  is	  even	  a	  ‘public	  good’	  security	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  and	  if	  so,	  who	  derives	  authority	  from	  it	  and	  why.	  If	  private	  actors	  have	  such	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  the	  use	  of	  coercive	  force	  in	  its	  defence,	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  ‘civilized’	  security	  ideology	  there	  is	  assembled	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  private	  interests,	  rather	  than	  the	  democratic	  security	  interests	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  public	  security	  project,	  are	  privileged.	  Perhaps	  states,	  private	  security	  actors	  and	  the	  maritime	  community	  recognize	  that	  the	  interests	  (and	  authority)	  of	  the	  commercial	  shipping	  industry,	  and	  not	  the	  democratic	  interest	  of	  the	  nation,	  provide	  the	  moral	  basis	  for	  thinking	  about	  a	  ‘collective	  good’	  in	  offshore	  security	  provision,	  and	  thus	  that	  the	  state	  has	  no	  automatic,	  significant	  role	  in	  enforcing	  it.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  state	  may	  see	  its	  responsibilities	  as	  a	  security	  guarantor	  as	  diminished	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  its	  territory,	  and	  its	  exclusive	  authority	  to	  distribute	  authority	  over	  and	  use	  coercive	  force	  (if	  it	  ever	  existed)	  as	  not	  worth	  protecting.	  Although	  this	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  similar	  to	  the	  assembly	  of	  coercive	  force	  on	  private	  property	  (where,	  because	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  rights	  afforded	  by	  property	  ownership,	  the	  state	  may	  be	  ‘philosophically	  disinclined’	  from	  exercising	  authority)	  (Shearing,	  Stenning	  1983,	  p.	  497),	  the	  spatial	  and	  institutional	  independence	  of	  maritime	  PSAs	  means	  that	  the	  two	  situations	  are	  far	  from	  analogous.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  must	  be	  stressed	  here	  that	  the	  approach	  of	  states	  to	  the	  maritime	  private	  security	  sector	  has	  not	  been	  homogenous.	  As	  Cusumano	  and	  Ruzza	  (2015)	  highlight,	  the	  Italian	  Government	  (following	  an	  initial	  unwillingness	  to	  authorize	  private	  security	  guards	  on	  board	  its	  flagged	  vessels)	  now	  pursues	  a	  ‘hybrid’	  regulatory	  policy	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  both	  licensing	  PSAs	  and	  vessel	  protection	  detachments,	  while	  the	  Spanish	  and	  German	  Governments	  also	  have	  their	  own	  unique	  regulatory	  approaches	  (Burgin,	  Schneider	  2015).	  Although	  Liss	  (2015)	  asserts	  that	  efforts	  to	  regulate	  the	  maritime	  security	  sector	  constitute	  the	  state’s	  desire	  to	  rein	  in	  private	  authority	  offshore,	  such	  a	  dichotomous	  representation	  of	  public	  and	  private	  belies	  the	  nuance	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  public	  and	  private	  become	  intermeshed	  and	  are	  reconfigured	  in	  security	  provision,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  diversity	  of	  public-­‐private	  relationships	  across	  different	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  contexts.	  Although	  (as	  in	  any	  assemblage)	  public-­‐private	  competition	  and	  conflict	  undoubtedly	  occurs	  in	  particular	  maritime	  security	  governance	  structures,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  representation	  is	  not	  universally	  applicable.	  As	  Berndtsson	  and	  Ostensen	  (2015)	  argue,	  some	  states	  have	  sought	  to	  construct	  a	  ‘regulatory	  façade’	  in	  reference	  to	  maritime	  private	  security,	  which	  creates	  the	  impression	  of	  pervasive	  state	  regulation	  in	  spite	  of	  allowing	  private	  actors	  considerable	  authority	  in	  governance	  structures.	  Even	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  states	  have	  generally	  seemed	  accommodating	  of	  the	  proliferation	  of	  private	  force	  in	  public	  policing,	  we	  must	  remain	  mindful	  of	  the	  different	  articulations	  of	  public-­‐private	  relations	  between	  different	  flag	  states,	  regions	  and	  categories	  of	  maritime	  space.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  a	  different	  form	  of	  ‘public’	  security	  culture	  offshore	  might	  also	  present	  a	  challenge	  for	  scholarship	  that	  views	  private	  security	  proliferation	  (and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  multilateral	  security	  governance	  generally)	  as	  representing	  the	  functional	  and	  normative	  reconfiguration	  of	  a	  state-­‐centred	  security	  landscape.	  Although	  scholars	  differ	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  multilateralization	  of	  security	  governance	  (while	  some	  emphasise	  the	  ‘privatization	  revolution’,	  others	  stress	  the	  role	  of	  sub-­‐state	  processes	  beyond	  state	  control),	  there	  is	  a	  broad	  consensus	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  security	  actors	  occurs	  in	  front	  of	  a	  modern	  historical	  backdrop	  in	  which	  states	  have	  monopolized	  the	  practice	  of	  security	  both	  functionally	  and	  normatively	  (in	  the	  national	  interest).	  However,	  in	  maritime	  space,	  is	  it	  really	  meaningful	  to	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use	  the	  state,	  and	  statist	  security	  culture,	  as	  a	  reference	  point	  for	  the	  changing	  character	  of	  security?	  Rather	  than	  framing	  private	  security	  proliferation	  as	  the	  entry	  of	  a	  new	  security	  actor	  into	  a	  state	  security	  space,	  it	  might	  be	  more	  helpful	  to	  view	  the	  emergence	  of	  maritime	  PSAs	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  new	  insecurity,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  security	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  article	  has	  been	  to	  bring	  a	  unique	  spatial	  context	  of	  private	  security	  proliferation	  into	  mainstream	  theoretical	  debates	  on	  security	  governance,	  global	  assemblages,	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  public	  policing.	  As	  first	  point	  of	  inquiry,	  it	  sought	  to	  analyze	  public-­‐private	  relations	  in	  the	  new	  ‘public	  policing’	  assemblages,	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  state	  has	  largely	  retained	  a	  privileged	  position	  in	  the	  governance	  and	  delivery	  of	  coercive	  force.	  Given	  the	  consistency	  of	  this	  narrative,	  the	  article	  opined	  that	  this	  suggests	  that	  the	  state	  remains	  a	  crucial	  site	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  definition	  and	  enforcement	  of	  ‘public	  good’	  security,	  of	  the	  spatiality	  and	  logic	  of	  the	  public	  security	  project.	  	  	  It	  then	  examined	  the	  assembly	  of	  authority	  over	  coercive	  force	  in	  maritime	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations.	  It	  highlighted	  that	  in	  contrast	  to	  many	  public	  policing	  initiatives,	  private	  security	  actors	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  appear	  to	  be	  able	  to	  (with	  state	  complicity)	  both	  use	  and	  control	  the	  distribution	  of	  authority	  over	  coercive	  force.	  Some	  have	  expounded	  the	  virtue	  of	  reissuing	  letters	  of	  marque	  (and	  there	  have	  also	  been	  moves	  to	  establish	  private	  navies),	  while	  as	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  article	  sought	  to	  demonstrate,	  discourse	  emanating	  from	  international	  organizations,	  the	  private	  security	  industry	  and	  states	  themselves	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  no	  concrete	  normative	  distintion	  between	  public	  and	  private	  security	  actors	  in	  the	  legitimacy	  to	  use	  force	  offshore.	  It	  also	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  state	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  the	  private	  use	  of	  force	  offshore,	  and	  the	  role	  the	  security	  industry	  itself	  has	  played	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  The	  final	  section	  of	  the	  article	  sought	  to	  question	  what	  this	  means	  for	  the	  assembly	  of	  security	  offshore.	  Specifically,	  it	  argued	  that	  PSAs’	  possession	  of	  coercive	  authority	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  ‘civilized’	  security	  offshore	  may	  not	  be	  (as	  elsewhere)	  synonymous	  with	  the	  accountability	  and	  national	  interest	  represented	  by	  the	  state,	  but	  instead	  one	  in	  which	  the	  locus	  of	  authority	  and	  moral	  good	  is	  the	  commercial	  interests	  of	  the	  shipping	  industry.	  	  In	  such	  an	  assemblage,	  the	  maritime	  community	  recognizes	  that	  PSAs	  have	  near-­‐equal	  authority	  to	  states	  in	  enforcing	  a	  ‘civilized’	  security	  defined	  by	  private	  interests,	  rather	  than	  the	  democratic	  security	  logics	  through	  which	  state	  policing	  institutions	  are	  constituted.	  As	  an	  aside,	  it	  also	  suggested	  that	  this	  argument	  might	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  theoretical	  narratives	  with	  which	  we	  conceptualize	  of	  the	  proliferation	  of	  private	  security	  actors.	  If	  new	  multilateral	  security	  governance	  structures	  are	  generally	  perceived	  to	  represent	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  a	  security	  landscape	  in	  which	  the	  state	  has	  both	  normative	  and	  functional	  control	  over	  the	  practice	  of	  security,	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  statist	  security	  culture	  offshore	  (and	  the	  corresponding	  material	  question)	  poses	  a	  clear	  challenge	  to	  this	  historical-­‐conceptual	  timeline.	  	  	  The	  trajectory	  of	  maritime	  policing	  in	  the	  near	  future	  may	  provide	  further	  clues	  as	  to	  assembly	  of	  public	  and	  private	  in	  the	  maritime	  environment.	  The	  budgetary	  constraints	  on	  multinational	  naval	  forces	  are	  growing	  ever	  tighter,	  and	  with	  piracy	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  presently	  dormant,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  mandate	  of	  EU	  NAVFOR	  (the	  EU’s	  naval	  task	  force	  in	  the	  region),	  which	  expires	  in	  2016,	  will	  be	  renewed.	  This	  may	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  even	  greater	  state	  reliance	  on	  maritime	  private	  security	  infrastructure;	  possibly,	  the	  re-­‐ignition	  of	  the	  privateering	  debate,	  or	  moves	  to	  partially	  fund	  private	  armed	  transit	  teams	  in	  exchange	  for,	  say,	  information-­‐sharing.	  Either	  way,	  private	  security	  proliferation	  in	  the	  maritime	  environment	  represents	  a	  unique	  socio-­‐political	  context	  of	  multilateral	  security	  governance,	  and	  one	  that	  scholars	  of	  private	  military	  and	  security	  contracting	  should	  take	  more	  account	  of	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	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